
FOR THE LAST TIME, CCS! YOU'RE NOT A SWAN! YOU'RE JUST UGLY!






Rotterdam Opslag en Afvang Demonstratieproject (ROAD)

Lessons Learnt


CATO Meets the projects 15th November 2017 Andy Read, ROAD Technical Director


















Highlights on Capture, Transport & Storage (1)

Capture

- Proven capture technology available on market:
 - Multiple suppliers offering robust designs
- Some technical unknowns due to limited experience:
 - Design of 2012 would have needed some modification
 - Wise to allow for some contingency and some 'teething' problems
 - ... but engineers can solve all the engineering problems
- Conclusion: the technology is available and will work



Highlights on Capture, Transport & Storage (2)

Transport

- Some remaining technical uncertainties:
 - How to predict and manage two-phase flow behaviour (including transients)
 - QRA modelling for (onshore) CO₂ transport pipeline needs further development (e.g. "domino effect")
- But the pipeline is largely conventional technology.
- Conclusion: the technology is available and will work



Highlights on Capture, Transport & Storage (3)

Storage

- Some remaining technical uncertainties:
 - Transients and two-phase flow in the well
 - Tolerance of the well to repeated temperature changes
- But a safe design was developed.
- Major regulatory barrier: Storage Liabilities.
 - The costs of long term storage liabilities are largely controlled by regulators and/or Government, and are largely out of the control of the operator.
 These liabilities need to be carried by the Government.
 - Especially true for large-scale or long-term projects.

Conclusions:

- The storage technology is available and will work,
- But storage regulation is not (yet) fit for purpose.




Why did ROAD fail?

- Nobody was prepared to pay for it
- Industrial partners do not have a business case:
 - Neither short-term nor long-term (CO₂ price doesn't work on its own)
 - Perception that "industry must contribute" was not shared by industry!
- Public funders did not have sufficient public and political support:
 - CCS perceived as extending life-time of coal plants
 - CCS "competes" with investments in renewables
 - CCS positioned as (optional) measure of 'last resort'
- In summary: ROAD was a project without a customer



Why did other European Projects Fail?







Key lesson learnt

- Government has to fund CCS:
 - There is no other customer
- To succeed the projects must be designed and run to maximise long term Government support.
- Therefore do things which make it easy for the Government to support you, and hard for them to stop.



Personal recommendations for a new project

- Start small if expensive, it's too tempting to cut the budget
- A "no regrets" first step:
 - No implied lock-in to follow-on projects that scares people
 - But scalable support the long term decarbonisation vision
- Select non-controversial capture and storage sites
 - e.g. waste incinerator (avoid fossil fuel if possible) and off-shore gas storage
- Create a local (public) value proposition and local supporters e.g. supporting jobs, local industry, CO₂ use if possible (e.g. greenhouses)
- Avoid large profits for private parties (politically inexplicable)
 - Therefore Government / public bodies must carry long term risks (e.g. storage liabilities)
- Create / support an active pro-CCS political lobby
 - Publicly, proactively advocate the project and CCS in general



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